The Ukrainian agreement to support the US proposal for a 30-day ceasefire in the war against Russian aggression focuses on what Moscow may or may not agree with, and what pressure the Trump administration can bring on Vladimir Putin.
Over the past few years, we’ve been asked frequently about the possibility that Putin may be using it more than Trump, and the question here is something Trump has to persuade him.
On Wednesday, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the US had contacted Russia later that day, suggesting Washington wanted a “positive answer.”
Moscow says Washington needs to explain before replying.
By Wednesday, it was clear that despite Rubio’s optimism, Putin intended to ensure the greatest advantage from his speech on the ceasefire.
“It’s difficult for Putin to agree in his current form,” a senior Kremlin source told Reuters, “Putin has a strong position as Russia is moving forward.
“Yes, we support a truce with both hands, but at least we need it from the framework guarantee and at least from the US,” the source said.
The reality is that despite the war losses of the masses of Russia, the damage to the economy and diplomatic isolation, they believe it is winning the war.
Despite the continued advancement of the Russian troops through the ice age at large costs, they believe that a ceasefire will benefit Ukraine, and the view should be reflected in negotiations.
Rubio admits that territorial concessions have already been raised with the Ukrainian delegation in Jeddah earlier this week, so that Trump has to offer Putin seems more in the way of carrots than something Ukraine is hard to accept.
The broader US sanctions and tariffs on Russia, which Trump said he has been considering recently, are unlikely to have a major impact on negotiations to persuade Moscow to agree to a ceasefire.
As Alexander Colindl of the European Centre for Policy Analysis said, “Exports to Russia to Russia fell by more than 80% in the previous period last year, prompting the only harmful bank sanctions since 1992.
Another way is that Trump can give Putin.
The US administration’s deal with Moscow has already broken one taboo since the Biden era. This defies a broad US-European unanimity that Russia should be diplomatically isolated.
However, it is the economy that Russia remains the most vulnerable. The costs of war and international sanctions have not collapsed the economy in the way some suggest it, but high interest rates and low growth are slowly crippling Russia.
As an incentive, the US could put an end to bank sanctions and bans on access to Western technology, and many non-US sanctions are likely to remain from countries allied with Ukraine.
Beyond that, the problem becomes more complicated. Putin’s long-term demands remain the same. Demilitarizing Ukraine, its commitment to not join NATO in the future, and his desire to retain the annexed territory of the Crimea, in particular.
None of them could fly alongside Ukraine’s European allies.
Trump’s unsolved pressure on Ukraine, including a recent meeting with Ukrainian president Voldymir Zelensky at the White House – may have persuaded Putin of the relative weakness of leverage with Russia.
As John Luff, a Chatham House assistant fellow, wrote last year before last, “I think Trump believes he will have the advantage in relations with the United States because of his sense that Putin has lost control of the world affairs.”
All of these leave one meaningful lever. It is an increase in US military support for Ukraine.
But it is not lost to anyone that this is likely Trump’s least preferred approach, especially after a temporary suspension of such aid to Kiev.
