US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced Thursday that as many as 8,000 North Korean troops have been deployed to Russia’s western Kursk region. U.S. intelligence suggests North Korea will join the fight along the 270-square-mile salient carved out of Kursk by Ukrainian forces starting in August. “We expect that to happen within the next few days,” Blinken said.
The North Korean deployment could add weight to the Russian offensive in Kursk and help the North Korean military, which has not fought a major war in 70 years, gain valuable experience. However, it is also possible that the deployment will have no impact on the front lines, and that many North Koreans will be killed without anyone learning anything.
It is not without reason that the Kremlin directed North Korean reinforcements to Kursk. Last month, Russian forces counterattacked the Ukrainian salient in the region. Russian forces advanced a short distance on the west side of the salient. But to the east, Ukrainian forces have been slaughtering residents by firing on them from a fortress believed to have been captured from Russian forces in August.
The Russian Navy’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade is responsible for the main counterattack along the eastern edge of the salient. The 2,000-strong brigade has suffered heavy losses in recent days. On or just before October 24, the brigade’s 382nd Separate Battalion sent 16 scouts to investigate Ukrainian positions, apparently around Russkaya Konopelka or nearby settlements.
“Our objective was to discover the enemy,” one of the scouts explained in a video translated by Estonian analyst WarTranslated. “We did it,” the scout said. He and his 15 comrades probably located a Ukrainian machine gun position in one of the many defensive earthworks advancing captured Ukrainian troops from the Russian garrison that had been ambushed at Kursk in August. replied by radio.
But then the battalion or brigade commander took an unexpected action. They ordered lightly armed scouts to attack machine gun nests directly. “The enemy had overwhelming numerical superiority,” the scout explained. “There were four groups of four people each. Two groups no longer exist.”
The survivors threatened to revolt. “We don’t want to be in this battalion anymore,” said the scout. “We will not be cannon fodder.”
Support is coming in the form of several regiments of North Korean troops. While Russian marines failed in Kursk, it remains to be seen whether North Korean forces will succeed. But it’s an ominous sign that Russia has only assigned one interpreter to about 30 North Koreans, according to the Institute for the Study of War in Washington, D.C.
Russian commanders may not expect to work closely with North Korean platoons. Instead, Russian officers may issue simple, broad orders and hope for the best. This reckless command and control led to the killing of scouts from the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade in a senseless direct attack on entrenched Ukrainians. There is also the possibility that many North Koreans will be killed.
According to ISW, North Korea is keen for its troops to gain combat experience. If so, this war would essentially be a very dangerous exercise for the North Koreans in Kursk. The risk, of course, is that the North Koreans will learn what the Russian Marines have recently learned: that commanders are cruel or ignorant, or both, and that it is unhealthy to follow the stupid orders of indifferent officers. is what you learn.
“What if the Russian military command decides to use North Korean personnel in a ‘cannon fodder’ manner and not take advantage of the specialized training of certain North Korean units,” ISW mused. Whatever battlefield lessons North Korea hopes to learn. ”