Russia faces the prospect of losing key bases in Syria, but it still has work to do. Maintaining the base may ultimately require Russia to strike favorable deals with the groups it attacks and emerges victorious. These bases are critical to Russia’s influence in the Middle East, and it won’t be easy. Replaced.
Syria has been central to Russia’s plans to expand its influence across the Middle East – as evidenced by its recent signing of a 49-year lease for a Syrian base.
But with the ouster of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, a Russian-backed ally, Russian officials face the possibility that their time in Syria may be numbered.
Ben Dubow, non-resident senior fellow in the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, said: “Russia is certainly doing everything in its power to maintain its presence in Syria, but there is a possibility that this could come to an end.” Ben Dubow, a non-resident senior fellow in the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told Business Insider.
Dubou said: “According to[Hyatt Tahrir al-Sham’s]official Telegram channel, the Russian government not only abandons ships at sea, but also does so by providing weapons to local Alawite groups. “There is,” he said. “Reaching out to new leaders is both an act of desperation and an acceptance of a new reality.”
This is a discussion of the dimming options currently facing Russia.
Reduced footprint
Immediately after Assad fled to Russia, an agreement was reportedly reached with the transitional authorities led by the victorious Islamist movement Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to guarantee the security of these bases, and armed rebels currently has no plans to attack the base. Still, it is unclear whether Damascus’ future leaders will tolerate a long-term Russian military presence.
For now, some Russian warships are anchored outside the Tartus base as a precaution, and there are other Russian military operations in Syria.
Anton Mardasov, a non-resident scholar at the Syria Program at the Middle East Institute, told BI that “quite a lot of military equipment is being withdrawn hastily to coastal areas or is currently being withdrawn from various remote locations.” “Therefore, ships from the Baltic Fleet heading to Syria and military transport planes coming to Hmeimim may be taking this surplus equipment with them.”
Alongside the Tartus naval base, Russia also has a large airbase in Latakia named Hmeimim, which it has used as a launching pad for airstrikes across Syria since intervening in the bloody civil war in 2015.
“It may not be a question of completely removing the base at this point,” Mardasov said. “Rather, the new government that may be appointed after March 2025 should issue a decree condemning or justifying past agreements between Damascus and Moscow.”
Mardasov said that keeping a minimum number of troops in Syria would “deprive” Russia of its ability to counter NATO in the south.
Related articles
updated access
A Russian SU-24M fighter jet takes off from the air base in Hmeimim, Syria, in 2015. Russian Ministry of Defense Press Service (via AP)
Russia signed a 49-year, extendable lease for these bases with the Assad regime in 2017, appearing to entrench Russian forces in the Middle Eastern country for generations to come. The treaty also granted the Russian military legal immunity for military personnel stationed in the country, meaning they cannot be held responsible for killing Syrians.
“I cannot say whether the 2017 agreements are binding, but at this point only Russia can enforce them, and there is no indication that Russia has the will or ability to do so,” Dubow said. said. “If Damascus orders Russia to withdraw, Moscow will find it difficult to withstand the siege.”
Russia’s best hope may be to try to expand access until it can reach a new deal with Syria’s new leaders. The offer will likely have to be extremely lucrative to win the support of Syrian rebels accustomed to Russian airstrikes and ruthless mercenaries.
Russia is likely to offer economic incentives, such as money or discounts on refined fuel products, in exchange for Syria’s new rulers accepting a military presence.
However, these are likely to be short-term arrangements.
Matthew Orr, Eurasia analyst at risk intelligence firm RANE, said: “Given the considerable anti-Russia sentiment among new Syrian officials following Russia’s long-standing support for the Assad regime, the long-term “It is unlikely that Russia’s use of the facility will be maintained in the future.” .
He said the Syrian Transitional Authority could even benefit from Russia’s continued presence in the short term. It could offset the US presence on the other side of the country and serve as a bargaining chip in negotiations with other countries.
complete withdrawal
If an agreement cannot be reached, Russia’s choices are difficult. They may try to defend their bases in an uneasy standoff with HTS-led forces, but this comes at the risk of their forces being harmed, captured, or exposed to a trial that would humiliate Russia. . Alternatively, troops and supplies could be airlifted.
RANE analyst Orr does not expect Russia to withdraw from Syria any time soon. Instead, Russia is preparing for “an orderly withdrawal from the facility, perhaps after attempts at preservation negotiations in the coming months fail,” Orr told BI.
“The loss of these facilities will have a negative impact on Russia’s power projection, as they are critical logistics hubs for Russia’s military operations in Africa, the Middle East, and for Russia’s global naval operations. “There are no readily available alternatives to these facilities in Russia.”
Tartus remains Moscow’s The only naval facility in the Mediterraneanhas become essential to the expansion of the Russian Navy south of the Black Sea and Turkish Straits. Along with Hmeimim, it serves as a support base for the deployment of Russian troops and mercenaries in Africa.
Moscow has had access to Tartus since the Soviet era in the 1970s. Furthermore, Russia invested in expansion in the 2010s, making the potential losses even more painful.
One of Russia’s alternative ports outside of Syria would be Tobruk in eastern Libya, which is controlled by Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. CEPA’s Dubow is skeptical that Libya’s ports near Egypt can serve as an alternative.
“Tobruk will not come close to replacing Tartus and Latakia,” Dubow said. “It is small and far removed from Russia. Even a significant reduction in Russia’s presence in Syria would be extremely damaging to Russia’s power projection capabilities.”
Could Russia’s loss be Türkiye’s gain in this case? Turkey is close to the HTS-led coalition but may lack the prestige to acquire a permanent base.
RANE’s Orr said: “The Turkish Navy does not need a Tartus base. The possibility of this depends on the local security situation, which remains uncertain for several months and seems unlikely in the short term. I think so.”
“But in general, the Tartus port is something that if there was a unity government in Syria, it would definitely try to use it for security or economic relations with major powers, or it would try to remove the base as part of the geopolitical balance between the major powers. ”
Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist and columnist who writes about developments, military, politics and history in the Middle East. His articles have appeared in various publications focused on the region.
