SYDNEY — Readers may expect that the beginning of 2025 will be dominated by political turmoil in the Indo-Pacific region. South Korea is unexpectedly seeking answers to its presidential impeachment, Australia is likely facing a closely divided parliament, and Japan is trying to form a government. The situation has been going on for more than a year, and China is predicting further uncertainty at the top of its military.
As South Korea elects a successor to impeached President Yun Seok-Yeol, his unexpected declaration of martial law poses a fundamental threat to hard-won democracy and calls for new diplomatic and national reforms. The contours of security policy will begin to emerge from the political fog. The most likely outcomes at this point seem to be a more modifiable approach toward China, increased skepticism of close intelligence ties with Japan, and a less hardline approach toward North Korea.
(This article is part of a series in which Breaking Defense reporters look back at the most important (and interesting) news of 2024 and predict what 2025 will hold.)
Japan, whose government led by Prime Minister Chigar Ishiba came under severe public criticism in late October elections, may struggle to maintain its intelligence-sharing agreement with South Korea. The General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) was originally signed for the two countries to share information about North Korea.
Under the terms of the original agreement, Japan was to send satellite images and electronic information to South Korean analysts, who in turn were to send human information to Japan in retaliation. The agreement also aims to allow the two countries to share real-time targeting information to counter North Korean missiles.
The weakening of the Japanese government could also have an impact on Japan-Australia relations, which are rapidly becoming strained. For example, the two countries currently talk about each other as partners second only to the United States, which is a major ally. In mid-November, the defense ministers of both countries, flanked by outgoing Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, announced that Japanese Marines would be regularly rotated to Australia for training and exercises.
Further south, Australia could also face electoral chaos, with national elections likely to be held in March (elections must be held by May). Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s Labor government is widely expected to win, but a group of MPs known as the Teals is gaining power, potentially widening the coalition between the Liberals and the ruling party. There is a good chance it will lose much of its authority. There is a possibility that the number of National Party members will increase rapidly.
That could be good for defense spending. Labor has spoken strongly about the region’s difficult strategic situation and the need to strengthen the trilateral AUKUS initiative and Australia’s major conventional weapons systems, but in reality it has not revised its defense spending plan from 2023 to 2026 in real terms. It has been revised downward. Whether that changes will depend on the election results. AUKUS could, at least in theory, benefit from increased support from the Liberal leadership.
Japan and South Korea’s efforts to work more closely with the so-called “Second Pillar” or “AUKUS” (research and development of advanced capabilities such as hypersonics, cyber, autonomy, artificial intelligence, underwater technology) It will depend on the political outcome in both countries and Australia. Evaluation of the next Trump administration.
On the other side of the geostrategic coin, in 2025 military planners, diplomats, and strategists will be watching closely as China continues to purge its military leaders for unknown reasons.
In the end, all of this will happen in the shadow of 2027. By 2027, the US says Chinese President Xi Jinping wants the People’s Liberation Army to have the ability to carry out an armed takeover of Taiwan. Australia and Japan are keenly aware of that date. Japan has significantly increased its defense spending to record levels and announced a strategy that makes Taiwan the cornerstone of many of its plans.
Few experts believe that Mr. Xi has set 2027 as the year he will actually try to occupy Taiwan, but although there are only two years left, military strategists usually assume the worst. Make a plan.
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