When Mike Casey arrived in Jerusalem in 2020, he wasn’t looking for a fight.
An Iraq veteran who joined the State Department and spent more than a decade in assignments across Asia, he arrived with the cautious optimism of a career diplomat. There will be two years of Arabic language training, a possible change of government, and a chance to serve as a diplomat. Make a difference. He would eventually rise through the ranks to become deputy political adviser for Gaza at the State Department.
What he didn’t expect was to become a key witness to what he describes as a systemic failure of U.S. foreign policy.
“The more you learn about this issue, the more you realize how bad it is,” Casey told the Guardian.
Mr. Casey resigned from the State Department in July after four years on the job, and unlike other recent high-profile government departures, he left the job in a measured manner. Now, sitting at the kitchen table of his home in a quiet suburb of northern Michigan, Casey wonders how he feels as one of only two people in the entire U.S. government with a clear focus on Gaza. He reflected on how he had become an unwilling chronicler of a humanitarian catastrophe.
“I got so tired of writing about dead children,” he said. “We just have to constantly prove to Washington that these children actually died, and then we just watch nothing happen.”
Casey’s duties included documenting humanitarian and political situations through confidential cables, investigations, and reporting. But his disillusionment was not sudden. It was a slow accumulation of bureaucratic betrayals, each report dismissed, each humanitarian concern bulldozed by political expediency.
“We were writing daily updates about Gaza,” he said. He said his colleagues often joke that if they attached cash to their reports, no one would read them.
More than 45,000 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza, with 90% of the population displaced and facing a catastrophic humanitarian situation on the brink of starvation, according to the latest UN figures. The conflict continues unabated despite international legal interventions, including an order by the International Court of Justice earlier this year to halt military operations in Rafah and the International Criminal Court’s pursuit of war crimes charges against Israeli leaders. , humanitarian aid has narrowly prevented total collapse.
Post-war planning meetings became a particular source of frustration in the months after Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel and the start of airstrikes and subsequent ground invasions of Gaza.
Casey said he and his colleagues developed a comprehensive strategy to rebuild Gaza, but it was systematically rejected. “We have outlined three key angles,” he explained. “Humanitarian aid, security infrastructure, governance. We will insist on linking Gaza and the West Bank, for the Palestinian Authority to assert control of Gaza at the gubernatorial and ministerial level, and at some point for the need for elections. I outlined what to do.”
But every proposal, whether it was a report or a meeting in Washington, drew the same reaction. “Every idea we came up with, the[Biden administration]just said, ‘Well, the Israelis have another idea.’
These Israeli proposals, including letting local clans run Gaza, struck him as not only unrealistic, but intentionally destructive.
“We’ve written numerous reports and cables explaining why this isn’t working,” he said. “It is not in our interest for warlords to rule Gaza.”
An internal job description seen by the Guardian confirms Mr Casey’s role, saying he was “lead political spokesperson for internal affairs and security issues in the Gaza Strip and Palestinian settlements”.
The more you know about this issue, the more you have to realize how bad it is.
mike casey
“This officer leads the mission’s interagency efforts on Gaza and supports Gaza’s economic issues.”
Officially established in 2022, the Palestinian Affairs Bureau is intended to be the cornerstone of U.S. engagement, communications, policy, and analysis with respect to the Palestinian Authority and territories, and is staffed by dozens of Americans and approximately 75 local officials. The staff belonged to it.
Its roots lie in the U.S. Consulate General in Jerusalem, which was merged with the U.S. Embassy in 2019 when then-President Donald Trump declared Jerusalem the capital of Israel.
However, its influence was overshadowed by the broader State Department response during the conflict. The State Department led high-level diplomatic efforts, including de-escalation and negotiations, security coordination with Israel, and engagement with other regional and international allies. The National Security Council also plays a central role in developing and implementing U.S. policy, working with the Department of Defense to advise the president and provide military assistance to Israel.
In response to Casey’s claims, a State Department spokesperson told the Guardian: “Israel has repeatedly stated that in addition to complying with international humanitarian law, it must take all practicable steps to prevent harm to civilians. This is a moral and strategic obligation.”
When President Trump left office, Casey initially hoped that the Biden administration would demonstrate a more balanced approach, but that has repeatedly disappointed him.
A particularly painful moment came near the beginning of the war. Joe Biden publicly questioned Casey’s own record of casualties (estimated at around 8,300 people killed within a month).
“I wrote the report,” he said. “What’s the point of me writing this if you’re going to ignore it?”
The White House’s National Security Council did not respond to a request for comment.
Unlike previous diplomatic assignments in Malaysia, China and Pakistan, Mr. Casey found direct negotiations with Israeli officials fundamentally different in terms of how to use U.S. influence.
“In Malaysia, we could face sanctions if we didn’t cooperate,” he explains. “With Pakistan, you could cancel training programs, you could cancel certain aid.”
“But with the Israelis it’s completely different. They just prolong the negotiations and in the end they will agree to whatever they want.”
Asked for comment, Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Oren Marmorstein said: “We do not see any need to respond to baseless accusations that stem solely from the grievances of former employees.”
By the time Mr. Casey left in July, the Palestinians had received about $674 million in total aid from the United States, compared to the White House’s $17.9 billion in military aid to Israel in the year to October. It had been given the go-ahead for a record-breaking dollar amount. Biden at one point signed a bill that would ban funding for a year to Unrwa, which helps Palestinian refugees in the region, as part of this year’s $1.2 trillion federal spending plan, but would not allow funding for Unrwa USA, a separate organization. Funding has been resumed.
Mr. Casey is not the only career official feeling frustrated and disillusioned at various levels of U.S. foreign policy. Last year, several high-profile resignations from the State Department included Josh Paul, director of the Office of Political and Military Affairs, Andrew Miller, assistant secretary for Israeli and Palestinian affairs, Anel Cherine, foreign affairs official, and Hala Harit, diplomat. there were.
We have been meeting for months to discuss a ceasefire. What surprised me was how little they actually moved
Khaled Elgindi
But what stands out about Casey’s path is his closeness to the conflict, his level of direct policy analysis, and his quiet retreat without public resignation.
“I was too embarrassed to continue being an American diplomat,” he said. “I knew I couldn’t go on another mission or mission.”
For some analysts of Middle East affairs, the administration’s efforts, which led to the resignations of officials, have reached an unusual level of dysfunction to the point of stagnation.
“We’ve been meeting for months to discuss a ceasefire,” said Roberts, director of the Middle East Institute’s program on Palestine and Israeli-Palestinian issues, who frequently meets with and advises administration officials. said Khalid Elgindi. “What struck me was that they actually barely moved. Every time I saw them, it was amazing. Virtually the needle didn’t move at all.”
For others, the administration’s own metrics served as an indictment of its approach.
Yousef Munayer, director of the Palestinian-Israel program at the Arab Center in Washington, D.C., said the handling of humanitarian aid has reached “levels we have never seen before.”
He described a calculated strategy in which the administration is “deliberately using this humanitarian aid tool as a way to buy time, de-escalate tensions within its own bases, and show it’s trying to do something.” did.
In October, the United States gave Israel a 30-day ultimatum in a leaked letter demanding at least 350 truckloads of humanitarian aid to Gaza. Despite explicit requests and aid levels that are well below baseline, the Biden administration has said it will not restrict arms deals once the deadline expires due to limited progress.
The humanitarian crisis in Gaza remains below basic human needs, with only 65 aid trucks now entering Gaza every day, the latest data from Mercy Corps and other relief agencies shows. It was found that the average number of vehicles sold has decreased from 500 units.
Far from diplomacy, Casey now works at a local bank, where he watches from afar and his criticism extends beyond a single administration. He sees the systemic failures of US policy towards the Palestinians, the complete lack of a coherent strategy, as hurting Israelis as well, and remains viscerally personal.
“I remember two children who were killed in a ramming attack at a bus stop in Jerusalem. They were the same age as my children,” Casey said. “We see that the conflict also affects the Israeli people. Not only the Palestinians, but also the Israelis have a right to better.”
What is his final assessment?
“We don’t have a policy on Palestine. We’re just doing what the Israelis want.”
