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The Israeli military has released the first official explanation of the mistakes that led to Hamas’ failure during the attack on October 7, 2023.
The report concludes that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) “failed its mission to protect Israeli civilians.”
The 19-page report includes many already known reports about what led to the catastrophic loss of around 1,200 lives when around 5,000 gunmen from Hamas and other Palestinian groups flooded Israel, and in the process won 251 hostages.
There is no dramatic revelation, but it is still calm to see the military’s conclusions about how they misinterpreted Hamas’ intentions and underestimated their abilities laid out in black and white.
The military saw Gaza as a secondary security threat and gave Iran and Hezbollah a priority, according to the report. Its policy towards Gaza states, “paradoxically: Hamas was illegal, but there was no effort to develop alternatives.”
The military says it has chosen a “conflict management” approach to dealing with Gaza. And Hamas had assumed that he was “not interested) or prepared for a massive war” – perceptions reinforced by Hamas’ own deception tactics.
Evidence from 2018 onwards suggests that Hamas, which has been banned as a terrorist group by Israel, the US, the UK and other countries, was actually unfolding. Ambitious plans are interpreted as “unrealistic or impossible” and reflect “long-term aspirations rather than Hamas’ viable threat.”
The report says in the months leading up to the war, the Military Intelligence Agency began developing new assessments, suggesting that Hamas’ plans were not merely a vision, but a “specific framework for operational planning.”
However, this new assessment did not draw the attention of senior officials in military intelligence.
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The report identifies a broad streak of self-satisfaction within the military, about Hamas’ intentions and how to deal with the threat it poses.
“There was no deep discussion about the question. What if we were wrong?” the report said.
Over time, a “significant and continuous gap between Hamas and the real-life intelligence report evaluation” developed.
The report also emphasizes that it is a “deep decline in knowledge in the various worldviews of the enemy, including culture, religion, language, and history.”
It calls for deep reforms in the Intelligence Agency’s culture of “promoting intellectual openness, skepticism, listening, learning, debate and constructive disagreement.”
It says that the desire to protect highly valuable sources contributed to the military’s failure to raise alert levels just before October 7th.
The Gaza Division said it was “effectively defeated for several hours” on October 7th, significantly impairing its ability to understand what is happening and respond effectively.
The Air Force responded quickly, but said, “The difficulty of distinguishing between IDF forces, civilians and terrorists was extremely difficult.”
The report also states that in some cases, wounded soldiers were evacuated in front of civilians.
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After presenting the findings to the commander on Monday, IDF’s resigning chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Helji Halevi, said he was fully responsible for his mistakes.
“I accept my responsibility. It’s mine. I was the commander of the Army on October 7th. I’m responsible, I have all your responsibility. I’m watching it like I do.
Last month, the general announced his resignation for the failure, calling for an investigation committee to conduct a broader investigation that would help prevent another attack.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has not acknowledged responsibility for what happened on October 7, said investigations in such states should wait until the war is over.
His critics accused Netanyahu of not wanting to admit his personal mistake.
Israel responded to the attack on October 7 by launching an air and ground campaign in Gaza, where at least 48,365 people were killed, according to the territory’s Hamasran Health Ministry.