CARLY: Hi, this is Carly (ph), here on my first trip to New York City. I just finished my business meeting for the day and now get to explore. I’m currently watching people swarm to take pictures of the Charging Bull. This podcast was recorded at…
ASMA KHALID, HOST:
12:35 p.m. Eastern time on Wednesday, February 12 of 2025.
CARLY: Things may have changed by the time you hear this, but I will have gone through the crowd to get my own picture. All right, enjoy the show.
(SOUNDBITE OF THE BIGTOP ORCHESTRA’S “TEETER BOARD: FOLIES BERGERE (MARCH AND TWO-STEP)”)
FRANCO ORDOÑEZ, BYLINE: I’ve been at that bull. The line is pretty long. My son loved it, though.
KHALID: Hey there. It’s the NPR POLITICS PODCAST. I’m Asma Khalid. I cover the White House.
ORDOÑEZ: I’m Franco Ordoñez. I also cover the White House.
KHALID: And today on the show, America’s new foreign policy in the Trump era. We try to decipher what it is and if it differs from the last time Trump was in office. And to help us make sense of these questions, we are joined by a special guest today, NPR’s Michele Kelemen. She covers the State Department…
ORDOÑEZ: Yay.
KHALID: …For NPR. Hey there, Michele.
MICHELE KELEMEN, BYLINE: Nice to be here.
KHALID: So I actually want to start the conversation with you, because you have covered foreign policy in a lot of different presidential administrations, Republican and Democrat. How would you describe this Trump administration’s world view?
KELEMEN: I’ve been covering the secretaries of state since Colin Powell was secretary, and there have been kind of, you know, rules of the road, the post-Cold War era, the post-World War II international institutions. All of this is kind of being thrown up for grabs again. I mean, I remember when I started, you know, we were talking about the end of history, right? We were talking about how everyone was moving to more liberal democracies around the world.
And now you have Russia and China being very kind of revanchist on the world stage, and you have a president who is talking about doing things like seizing the Panama Canal or seizing Greenland or taking over Gaza. I mean, you’re talking about kind of right-wing governments, populist governments in a lot of countries changing the way the world works.
ORDOÑEZ: Yeah. Trump never bought into the international rules-based system that Michele is describing. You know, he always, you know, pooh-poohed institutions, whether it was the Paris climate accords or the World Health organization or even NATO. But, you know, he kind of – in the past time, he kind of had guardrails. You know, you had people who did believe, people who surrounded him who did believe in those systems and kind of tried to keep those up. But Trump now has, you know, only loyalists who are just working for him and working for his vision. And he’s obviously a lot more confident this time because he’s got more experience to really plow through those things and kind of take on what many see as not isolationism, but kind of imperialism.
KHALID: I want to ask you more about that, because so much of Trump’s first term, and I would argue even parts of his campaign this time, revolved around the idea of America First. And now we are seeing a real interventionist streak. I mean, Michele, you mentioned wanting to seize the Panama Canal, take over Greenland, says Canada should become the 51st state of the United States and just yesterday, again reiterated that he wants to control the Gaza Strip. How do you reconcile this territorial, expansionist vision with the America First vision? Is that no longer part of Trump’s agenda?
ORDOÑEZ: No, I mean, I think it is. I mean, as it’s been explained to me, it is America First on steroids. It’s isolationism, but isolationism does not mean not being involved. Instead of these, you know, kind of rules systems, these international systems that kind of we’re talking about, instead of diplomacy, this idea of rising up all ships, of, you know, helping out friends, whether it’s socially, economically and diplomatically or democratically, and helping them go up with the idea that it will also help us, instead, it’s focused on what are the interests of the U.S. that can make the U.S. stronger? And it’s about using U.S. strength and power to kind of expand or grow that strength, and Greenland falls into that.
Trump makes it very clear that he sees that as a national security issue to kind of counter Russia and China. The Panama Canal, he wants more control of that because he feels China has too much influence in that. Canada, I think there’s other questions about it, but certainly minerals that are there that he’s concerned about and paying too much money.
KELEMEN: You know, it’s also about this idea that there were many years where the U.S. was trying to bring China into the fold in the World Trade Organization and things like this. And the feeling that Trump has is that China took advantage of that and now these rules should no longer apply.
KHALID: He seems to also have a real transactional approach to foreign policy. And we talked about this a bit yesterday on the podcast when we talked about Mexico and Canada and tariffs. But it seems like his broad view of trade, which he sees as really integral, I think, to his foreign policy, is about transactional relationships, right? He talks about this all the time, that it’s about creating fair and good deals with the United States.
And I did a little bit of reporting about this, actually, with the prime minister of India, Prime Minister Modi, who’s visiting tomorrow. All I keep hearing about in my interviews is that this is really going to be about trade and trying to get India to lower tariffs. Do you see this as well? – this idea lot of it is about transactional relationships?
ORDOÑEZ: Yeah. I think there’s no question that so much of this is about transactional relationships and feeling – at least Trump feeling that the U.S. has been taken advantage of in so many different ways, but specifically and especially on trade. Take the – not only the tariffs that he’s, you know, talking about with India, but also Mexico and Canada – the steel and aluminum tariffs.
But I will also add, that practice was kind of common in the first term as well. What is different now is he’s using some of these economic tools also to kind of try to seize, you know, other people’s territory. I mean, Greenland, he’s, you know, threatening big, huge tariffs on the Danish if they don’t cooperate. Same thing with Jordan. The king of Jordan was just here. He’s pressuring the king of Jordan to take in Palestinians so that the United States can take over Gaza and redevelop it. Obviously, the Arab leaders do not want to have anything to do with this, and he’s threatening tariffs there – or maybe not tariffs, but he’s threatening to pull U.S. aid from those leaders. So yes, it is about trade, yes, it is transactional, but it is also to a different degree than it was the first time.
KHALID: Michele, what’s interesting to me in this current moment is that there was, you could argue, one existing framework for these kinds of transactional relationships that the United States has, and I would argue that’s through foreign aid and development assistance – right? – USAID. And in theory, you know, the U.S. would help provide food aid or, say, build clean water systems, and in exchange it would get, you could argue, cooperation maybe in other fields. I know not everyone agrees with that vision of USAID, but it is now on the chopping block, and what that means is that all that soft power leverage is gone, isn’t it?
KELEMEN: Yeah, and it’s been really fascinating to watch because Secretary of State Marco Rubio keeps talking about how he wants to keep the programs that do advance U.S. interests. But the problem is really that all this is moving really fast, and what Rubio says is kind of a normal review process to figure out which programs are worth it for us, which ones aren’t worth it for us. During all of that, Elon Musk and his team are moving really quickly to kind of erase the whole agency. And there’s also a lot of misinformation that they’re spreading about USAID.
I mean, just remember this whole $50 million in condoms for Gaza. Fact-checkers found out that it was actually a less than $50 million aid program for Gaza in Mozambique that may have included some condoms in it. And when Elon Musk was asked about it, he basically just shrugged and said, well, I’m not going to be right all of the time. And so, you know, they’ve come in kind of breaking all of this down and spreading a lot of misinformation about it, and, you know, it could really be damaging to America’s long-term credibility in the world.
KHALID: All right. Well, let’s take a quick break. Lots more to discuss in a moment.
And we’re back. And, Michele, you’ve mentioned the secretary of state, Marco Rubio. He’s the former senator from Florida and former political rival to Donald Trump. You traveled with him the other week to the Panama Canal. I’m curious if you can tell us how much power Rubio has in his role, and is he able to influence Donald Trump’s foreign policy?
KELEMEN: It’s really hard to say. I mean, he’s about to go on his first trip to the Middle East in the coming days, at a time when President Trump is talking about not buying Gaza, but just taking it and cherishing it, as he put it. And there’s just a lot of alarm in the Arab world about that. But the way that Rubio talks about it, he kind of softens it or tries to explain what Trump may really mean. He seems to think that this is mostly about kind of lighting a fire under the Arab world to get them to do something about the Palestinians and to do something about Gaza because, you know, everyone’s big talk, but, you know, what are they doing about it, and how are they going to resolve it?
And, you know, when he went down to Panama, again, it came at a time when Trump is talking about seizing the Panama Canal, taking back the Panama Canal. And what Rubio talked about instead was, you know, there are legitimate concerns about the Panama Canal because there are Chinese companies that control ports on either end of it, and this is a problem for the United States. So he kind of is suggesting that we’re getting somewhere with the Panamanians, they’re auditing these Chinese companies, they’re not going to rejoin China’s Belt and Road Initiative. So he’s kind of portraying that as some wins.
ORDOÑEZ: Yeah, I think Rubio has a delicate road to kind of, you know, travel here. I mean, on the one hand, he is trying to kind of, you know, interpret or translate what Trump wants into more diplomatic and softer language. At the same time, he needs to be careful to not get on the wrong side of Trump. And I think it’s very clear that he is very conscious of that. I mean, what I see is different this time versus the first term – is, you know, with the former secretary of state, Rex Tillerson and Mike Pompeo, you know, they had their own visions, they had their own agendas. And whether it was right or wrong, I think they felt more empowered to pursue those.
I think in this go around, the people that are surrounding Trump are loyalists or know that they have to be super loyal if they want to survive. And that has kind of eliminated, you know, these so-called guardrails, these kind of things that are supposed to stop Trump from doing or pursuing kind of his worst instincts. And Rubio is a serious guy. He was one of the fastest people to go through the process. He was one of the most trusted members. He’s been on the Foreign Relations Committee. I mean, he knows the things that he’s talking about. So it is interesting to watch him kind of be so careful. At the same time, it makes perfect sense because he is in the Trump administration.
KHALID: Knowing the politics, you’re saying, of this moment, yeah.
KELEMEN: I’ve been hearing a lot of kind of concern by career people at the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department that, you know, he knows what they do, yet he’s kind of bought into this whole idea that it has to be completely revamped.
KHALID: I also want to drill down a little bit on the calls and meetings that President Trump has had to date with various foreign leaders. Just a bit ago, we got news that President Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Franco, what do you see is the significance of that call but also the meetings and calls that Trump has had on the calendar?
ORDOÑEZ: Yeah, I mean, I think it shows what his priorities are right now. I mean, the call with the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, today. You know, the vice president, JD Vance, is also meeting this week with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. It’s clear, you know, Trump campaigned on promising to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours. That, obviously, didn’t happen, but he is still pushing that and trying to get some type of agreement. He’s had a few calls with Putin, and they’re still trying to talk about that. Trump told me that he was planning to meet with Putin at, quote, “the right time.” When that is, we’ll see.
You know, obviously, he had the meeting with the king of Jordan, as we just talked about. This comes at a time that he’s trying to pressure Arab leaders to take in Palestinians so that there can be some overhaul of Gaza and turn it, as he has described, into the Riviera of the Middle East – something that the Arab leaders have, you know, dismissed so far. And Modi, he’s coming this week, going to talk about immigration and trade.
KHALID: Yeah. I mean, what I’ve been hearing is that trade is sort of top of the agenda for this visit with Modi and that there was no trade deal that the Indians and the Americans were able to reach during Trump’s first term, and that the Americans – that the Trump administration feels like it has leverage in this moment. I was speaking with someone who was in the National Security Council during Trump’s first term, working on these South Asia issues, and says that the moment is different for Trump right now – right? – as you all have been saying. I think he’s surrounded himself also very much by loyalists, but there’s a sense, I think, of confidence that this Trump administration has to pursue, I think more aggressively, trade deals this time.
KELEMEN: I’ll be so interested to hear how Modi spins this, too, though, because Rubio is not going to a G20 meeting because Elon Musk is angry with some South African policies, and so, suddenly…
KHALID: And the G20 is supposed to be in South Africa this year, yeah.
KELEMEN: And the G20 is in South Africa. You know, so this kind of go-it-alone approach, it could be damaging because countries have other partners other than the U.S.
KHALID: One final question for both of you, and that is that, you know, when you look at polls, it seems like Americans don’t care a whole lot about foreign policy. It’s never really at the top of their agenda for why they vote for a particular candidate. And if there are, then, big shifts in foreign policy, say between this Trump second term and Joe Biden, the previous president, do you think that the typical American will notice? Will they pay much attention to it? And why does it matter?
KELEMEN: You know, one thing I always find fascinating is that when you look at polls, people think that 25% of the American budget goes to foreign aid when it’s less than 1%. So, you know, we’re talking about these issues, like, as if these are really driving Americans’ thinking, but these kinds of things resonate with voters. And I think a lot of this is really that. It’s mostly about show. And then when it comes down to it, the policy changes aren’t as big as how they’re made out to be.
ORDOÑEZ: Yeah. I mean, I agree. I think a lot of it is show. And I think part of that is because of how it’s become such a political issue. I mean, as Michele says, kind of pushing this idea that so much of U.S. money is going overseas when it could or should be spent here domestically. And, you know, just Trump himself making this shift, I think, is grabbing a lot of people’s attention. You know, I find it very fascinating that Republicans are going along with so many of these issues, which are so clearly against traditional Republican views, but it’s another example of how Trump has such a grip on the Republican Party. Because if Trump all of a sudden, you know, decided to go back to the WHO, for example, or start supporting NATO in a different way, I think few people who follow him would have any doubts that so many Republicans would jump right on board.
KHALID: Yeah.
KELEMEN: And the other interesting thing on aid is so much of it is, you know, actually supporting the U.S. defense industry and, in terms of USAID, helping U.S. farmers. When any of this filters down to these senators’ constituents, then that might change their opinions about it.
KHALID: All right. Well, such an interesting conversation. Michele, thank you so much for coming on the show.
KELEMEN: Nice to be here.
KHALID: And that is a wrap for today. I’m Asma Khalid. I cover the White House.
ORDOÑEZ: I’m Franco Ordoñez. I also cover the White House.
KHALID: And thank you all, as always, for listening to the NPR POLITICS PODCAST.
(SOUNDBITE OF THE BIGTOP ORCHESTRA’S “TEETER BOARD: FOLIES BERGERE (MARCH AND TWO-STEP)”)
Copyright © 2025 NPR. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.npr.org for further information.
NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by an NPR contractor. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record.
