“Hybrid War”. This word has been thrown around a lot lately, said Pierre Huskey at Inter in Paris, and for good reason. Over the past two years, we have seen the Nord Stream gas pipeline between Russia and Germany destroyed in an explosion, and a gas pipeline and two data cables severed by a Chinese ship’s anchor in the Gulf of Finland. I’ve witnessed it. It was likely an act of sabotage in Germany, the UK, or other countries.
But last week we witnessed what we believe to be a “particularly alarming” example of this new type of warfare. Within hours, two undersea communications cables were severed from each other in the Baltic Sea, one an internet link from Lithuania to Sweden, and the other a communications link between Finland and Germany. It is possible that these cables were accidentally damaged, for example by a ship dragging its anchor. “But there can be little doubt that the two wires were cut within hours of each other” – and EU leaders were quick to blame “malicious actors”, saying they believed the West’s They claimed they were looking for new ways to compromise safety.
The reason this is so worrying is because submarine cables are “the backbone of the world’s internet and communications systems”, Jason Power told RTÉ (Dublin). These fiber-optic lines, typically 0.8 to 1.2 inches thick and installed by ships slogging slowly over thousands of miles at sea, carry 99 percent of Internet traffic between continents. The ability to “send data over incredible distances almost instantaneously” has made it essential to nearly every aspect of modern life, including sending emails, video calls, card payments, and watching videos online. I am. By interfering with the flow of data, adversaries can create chaos by “paralyzing” communications and commerce without resorting to direct military attack.
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Fritz Espenlaub said on BR24 (Ahaus) that the Baltic incident has not had such an impact, because “both Finland and Sweden have a large number of alternative data connections.” He said it is well-positioned to address individual cable failures. But what is worrying is that cables in the region are being targeted with increasing frequency and that Western governments can’t do anything to stop it.
So who was behind the alleged sabotage in the Baltic Sea? Maybe it was Russia, says Anatole Lieven on UnHerd. The cable cutting coincided with the US authorizing Ukraine to use long-range missiles deep into Russian territory, and Vladimir Putin may have wanted to send a warning to allies in Kiev. West. But the more likely culprit appears to be a Chinese merchant vessel, said Elizabeth Breaux in Foreign Policy magazine in Washington. Within hours of the second cable, C-Lion 1, being severed, the Chinese-flagged bulk carrier Yi Peng 3 was identified as being of interest to authorities. It left the Russian Baltic port of Ust-Luga on November 15, two days before the first cable was cut. As she sailed into the Atlantic Ocean, she was pursued by the Danish Navy. He is now believed to have been detained by Danish authorities. But Beijing denies any involvement, and Denmark has few clear options on how to proceed, as sabotage by non-military vessels is outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Falk Steiner from Deutschlandfunk in Berlin said NATO and the EU have been discussing how to better protect undersea cables for years, as current measures are clearly insufficient. But there is no easy solution, say Oliver Klein and Scarlett Sternberg of ZDF Hoyte (Mainz). Oceans cover 70% of Earth’s surface, but only 5% of them are accurately mapped. That’s why big technology and telecommunications companies are laying cables deep underwater in unexplored areas where law enforcement lacks the resources to monitor them.
NATO is at least trying to bridge the gap, Brough said, and in May NATO held the first meeting of its new Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network. But “the next time saboteurs arrive, and they will, NATO navies will face the same painful questions about how to respond.” These vast networks of cables and pipelines were “a product of the era of harmonious globalization. Now they are the new frontier.”
