Algeria, which has long advocated non-intervention, has for some time faced increasing security risks posed by the growing presence of Russian mercenary agency Wagner Group in neighboring Mali. Despite Algeria’s historic ties with Russia, President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has publicly criticized the use of mercenaries in both Mali and Libya. As tensions rise, Algeria faces the delicate task of balancing its vital partnership with Russia while considering whether military intervention in Mali is necessary to protect its interests. This article examines Algeria’s position on Russia’s operations through Wagner’s forces in Mali and the potential implications of Algeria’s response.
In January 2024, Mali’s military government formalized the 2015 Algiers Accords, a peace agreement that was key to maintaining relative stability between the Malian government and the Tuareg-led Azawad Movement Coordination Organization. Finished it. The decision followed the expulsion of French troops and the withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali at the end of 2023, increasing tensions with ethnic Tuareg separatists in northern Mali. The junta made the declaration due to Algeria’s hostility and the change in the attitude of the signatories. The agreement is “totally inapplicable” and represents a major diplomatic setback for Algeria. Wagner’s presence in Mali further weakens Algeria’s central role as a mediator, undermining efforts to promote political stability, particularly through dialogue with Tuareg separatists.
Algeria’s growing concern over Wagner in Mali
Algeria’s concerns about Wagner highlight fundamental disagreements over how to deal with instability in Mali. While Algeria emphasizes the need to address the sociopolitical grievances of the marginalized Tuareg people, Mali’s Wagner-backed military government focuses on a pre-emptive military approach. Despite some tactical victories, such as the recapture of Kidal, this strategy has failed to contain the escalating violence. Wagner’s aggressive tactics, such as the forced eviction of Tuareg communities and targeting of Fulani civilians, have only exacerbated local grievances, and the Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal-Islami group in the Greater Sahara region It has a direct impact on the recruitment activities of jihadist groups such as the Islamic State and the Islamic State.
Algeria fears that these rising tensions could lead to a successful Tuareg separatist movement and encourage marginalized ethnic groups across Algeria, Niger and Libya to seek autonomy. A Tuareg defection in Mali could destabilize the already fragile Sahel region, with Algeria’s southern border particularly vulnerable. This separatist threat will further complicate Algeria’s efforts to manage internal security as well as transnational challenges such as migration flows, jihadist violence, and human trafficking networks. Beyond immediate security threats, Algeria’s economic ambitions are becoming increasingly uncertain as instability in Mali disrupts major infrastructure projects. Trans-Saharan gas pipeline delays threaten Algeria’s goal of becoming a major energy supplier to Europe, while the deteriorating security environment puts initiatives such as the Trans-Saharan Highway at risk . These setbacks could have a lasting impact on Algeria’s economic relations with both Europe and sub-Saharan Africa.
The threat to Algeria became clear in July 2024, when a Tuareg-led coalition known as the Azawad People’s Defense Strategic Framework ambushed Wagner mercenaries and Malian troops near the border town of Tinsauaten, just 19 miles from Algeria. It became clear. This resulted in fierce fighting in which dozens of Wagner and Malian soldiers were killed. According to reports, up to 50 combatants were killed in the battle, with Wagner suffering one of the heaviest losses in Africa. This ambush brings Algeria’s security concerns to the forefront, exposing the vulnerability of its borders and allowing it to counter Russian-backed forces in the Sahel without jeopardizing its vital relationship with Russia. The diplomatic dilemma over the method deepened.
Balancing security and Russian relations
Algeria’s deep historical ties with Russia date back to Soviet support during the independence movement, and as part of a broader strategy to counter French influence in the West, particularly in the Sahel, Algeria was implicitly Some speculate that he may have facilitated Wagner’s stay in Mali. But while Algeria maintains a strong partnership with Russia, concerns about Wagner’s presence are growing. By 2023, Tebboune began publicly criticizing the use of mercenaries, arguing that such interventions exacerbated instability rather than offering solutions. Tebboune also argued that resources should be allocated to addressing the socio-economic problems causing regional unrest, as he similarly argued in relation to the conflict in Libya, where the involvement of foreign mercenaries only exacerbated the chaos. He emphasized that.
Algeria’s response to Wagner is as much about maintaining its own regional influence as it is about maintaining a delicate balance with Moscow. Although Mr. Tebboune has publicly criticized the use of mercenaries, Algeria has so far preferred quiet diplomacy, conveying concerns about Mr. Wagner’s presence to Russian authorities without risking direct confrontation. Algerian sources confirmed that tensions exist and that Algerian authorities have expressed concerns about Wagner’s destabilizing role in Mali and Libya. Meanwhile, Russian officials are reportedly seeking Algeria’s intervention in negotiations for the release of Wagner, a operative who was captured in an ambush near the border and is still being held by Tuareg separatists.
Despite their differences, there is a strong belief within Algiers that Moscow attaches too much importance to its relations with Algeria to allow the dispute over Wagner to cause a rift. Algeria is one of Russia’s largest arms customers and relies heavily on Moscow for advanced military equipment. This link was strengthened in June 2023 when the two countries signed an agreement that goes beyond military cooperation and deepens their strategic partnership. At the same time, Algeria seems wary of maintaining a high degree of independence. It abstained from a UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but also reportedly rejected Russia’s request for naval access to the Oran base. Algeria has instead used its strategic position to strengthen ties with Europe, becoming a major energy supplier as the continent reduces its dependence on Russian gas.
Algeria’s options: diplomacy or military intervention?
Algeria’s current approach to Wagner reflects a careful balance between strategic restraint and active diplomacy. Although Algiers has expressed disapproval of Wagner’s destabilizing role in Mali, Algeria’s long-standing economic and military ties with Russia remain unlikely to lead to a direct confrontation with Moscow. Instead, Algiers has resorted to quiet diplomacy to seek limits on Wagner’s activities while strengthening ties with Europe to maintain strategic autonomy.
However, Algeria is under increasing pressure to take more decisive action, weighing the risks of military intervention against the potential consequences of inaction. A 2020 constitutional amendment authorizing military operations abroad provides a legal framework for intervention. However, such measures could cause domestic instability and public backlash, especially against the backdrop of recent elections and a fragile political situation. Regionally, Algeria is also feeling tensions due to Morocco’s growing influence in West Africa through economic and military alliances. This dynamic gives urgency to Algeria’s decision-making to maintain its traditional influence in the Sahel.
However, any military intervention by Algeria would likely be limited in scope and focused on high-profile incidents such as the Tinsauaten ambush. The aim would be to restore the delicate balance between the Wagner-backed Malian military junta and the Tuareg rebels, rather than engage in broader operations or directly target Wagner’s forces.
The views expressed in this commentary are those of the authors and do not represent the views of RUSI or any other institution.
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